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Abstract
Business groups in emerging markets perform better than unaffiliated
firms. One explanation is that business groups substitute some functions of
missing institutions, for example, enforcing contracts. We investigate this
by setting up a model where firms within the business group are connected
to each other by a vertical production structure and an internal capital
market. Thus, the business group’s organizational mode and the financial
structure allow a self-enforcing contract to be designed. Our model of a
business group shows that only sequential investments can solve the ex post
moral hazard problem. We also find that firms may prefer not to integrate.
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1. Introduction
In his famous essay, Gerschenkron (1962) argues that, in relatively backward coun-
tries, the productive and organizational structures differ from those in established
industrial countries. Business groups are among the organizational structures that
dominate many emerging markets. They are a “[...] collection of firms bound
together in some formal and/or informal ways.” (Granovetter, 1994, p. 454).
Business groups take very different forms, depending on the institutional and eco-
nomic conditions in which they operate. In some groups, cross shareholding is
the main characteristic, whereas in others a bank plays the central role. In Rus-
sia, for instance, business groups emerged around banks that establish common
financial control by means of their lending practice. Thus, these groups are hybrid
organizational forms between firm and market. There is widespread evidence that
business groups in emerging markets perform better than unaffiliated firms.
It has been conjectured that business groups can be advantageous because they
are substitutes for missing institutions (Khanna, 2000). We provide a theoretical
explanation of how business groups can act as substitutes for missing institutions
such as contract enforcement. Based on stylized facts on Russian business groups,
we study the case of vertically related firms and the involvement of an external
lender. We demonstrate that sequential investment may solve the underinvest-
ment problem resulting from ex post moral hazard. Our analysis also shows that
firms can have an incentive not to integrate but instead to form a business group
where decisions about production and investment are taken by legally independent
firms.
We use a two-period model to analyze the features of a self-enforcing contract
in a business group. A vertical chain of monopolies is considered in which the
production choice and the decision to undertake a cost-cutting investment by one
firm results in an externality for other firms. The firms decide to form a business
group with a bank that provides loans to finance cost-cutting investments and
exerts common financial control. Each firm can invest in cutting costs. How-
ever, in the first period, institutions are deficient because contracts cannot be
enforced by law. An ex post moral hazard problem therefore exists in the case
of debt financing as firms have an incentive to default strategically. Only in the
second period have legal institutions improved and contracts are enforceable. In a
business group, the firms are connected through the internal capital market. An
additional externality thus arises as the bank only finances projects in the second
period if the loan made in the first period is repaid.
The first result of our analysis is that these two externalities (created by the
cost-cutting investment and by the internal capital market) can be used to solve
the ex post moral hazard problem if investments are undertaken sequentially: con-
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sider a firm that receives credit from the bank in the first period for a cost-cutting
investment. If this firm defaults, investment by another firm in this vertical pro-
duction chain will not be financed by the bank in the second period. This means
that the defaulting firm does not enjoy a higher profit in the second period be-
cause, in this case, the cost-cutting investment is not made by the other group
member. This gives the firm an incentive to repay in the first period. The second
result is that it can be efficient not to integrate. We show that relying on the
externalities present in a business group allows the firms to design a self-enforcing
contract that solves the ex post moral hazard problem in the first period. Thus, a
business group can provide credit finance in the first period. In contrast, an inte-
grated firm, in which decisions about production and investment are centralized,
does not get a loan in the first period. The reason is that contract enforcement
possibilities are missing and that due to the integrated structure there are no
externalities that allow for a self-enforcing contract.
This paper is related to different areas in the literature: business groups, in-
ternal capital markets, sequential investment, vertical disintegration and ex post
moral hazard. There are numerous empirical studies of business groups but only
a few theoretical contributions. The empirical studies demonstrate that the per-
formance of business groups in emerging markets is superior to that of unaffiliated
firms (e.g. Khanna and Palepu, 1999, Perotti and Gelfer, 2001, Recanatini and
Ryterman, 2000). In his survey, Khanna (2000) suggests four different ways for
improving group performance. Business groups can expropriate minority share-
holders, engage in rent-seeking, or exert market power.1 In these cases, business
groups increase their payoff at the expense of other actors. Most importantly,
however, business groups can enhance efficiency by reducing market imperfec-
tions.2 In emerging markets, internal product, labor, and capital markets can
foster efficiency since outside markets function imperfectly.3
There are a few papers that study business groups in an economy with weak
institutions. In a general equilibrium model, Kali (1999) analyzes how business
networks can substitute for functioning institutions. This model shows that the
network absorbs honest agents and thereby has a negative impact on the anony-
1In a model of monopolistic competition, Feenstra, Huang and Hamilton (2003) study firms
that can integrate horizontally or vertically. They not only study the formation of business
groups but market structure in general and show that multiple equilibria can arise with either
high or low concentration.
2Therefore, an important conclusion of the survey is: “It is perhaps sensible to see groups
acting as substitutes for missing institutions, which would normally facilitate the functioning of
markets, in the economy (...).” (Khanna, 2000, p. 754) Therefore, business groups performing
this function are called “paragons” by Khanna and Yafeh (2005).
3Pyle (2002) shows that the lack of contract enforcement together with missing credit registers
reduces the scale of commercial lending.
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mous market where transactions are insufficiently protected by legal institutions.
Kali (2002) models the transition from relational contracting to arms-length ex-
plicit contracting that takes place when market intermediaries and institutions
develop. In this model, business groups are used for relational contracting. The
result here is that, during the transition period when institutions work imper-
fectly, the two modes of contracting complement one another. In Ghatak and
Kali (2001), banks cannot observe a firm’s productivity type when they decide
on refinancing. Information is obscured in a business group due to cross-debt
payment guarantees. The authors show that banks can offer a menu of contracts
and firms will sort according to their risk characteristics. Kim (2004) studies a
bank’s decision to refinance a defaulting firm. It is demonstrated that firms in
business groups are more likely to be refinanced than stand-alone firms. Banks are
often members of a business group where funds are allocated through an internal
capital market.
There are several papers analyzing theoretically the effects of internal capital
markets.4 Some of them emphasize the bright side of internal capital markets,
for example, that headquarters optimize the allocation of funds by reallocating
cash flow across divisions (Stein, 1997).5 However, this “winner-picking” policy
also has a dark side.6 The ex ante incentive of a divisional manager may suffer if
he anticipates that cash flow generated in this division will be reallocated by the
headquarters (Brusco and Panunzi, 2005).7 The theoretical literature on internal
capital markets hardly considers institutional imperfections that play an impor-
tant role in emerging markets. One notable exception is Almeida and Wolfenzon
(2006b) who point out the negative effect of winner-picking on social welfare.
Due to better information within business groups, capital is allocated internally.
Thereby, the supply of funds for the external market decreases. Thus, projects
that are more productive than those financed within a business group may not be
undertaken.
The choice between sequential and simultaneous investment has been studied
in an incomplete contract framework; through sequential investment, a complete
contract can be written on the investment in the second period. Smirnov and
Wait (2004a, 2004b) find that sequential investment improves the firm’s incentive
4The ownership of business groups is often organized as a pyramidial structure. Recent
papers provide theoretical explanations for this phenomenon and empirical evidence (Almeida
and Wolfenzon, 2006a; Bianco and Nicodano, 2006).
5The reallocation of resources within a group influences the firms’ behavior on the product
market (Cestone and Fumagalli, 2005).
6Moreover, power struggles and lobbying are value-destroying effects of internal capital
markets.
7The redistribution of cash flows may give rise to soft budget constraints. For a recent survey
see Dewatripont and Roland (2000).
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to invest in the second period but reduces its incentive to invest in the first
period. Moreover, sequential investment delays the completion of the project.
While in their model sequential investment leads to a delay, we find that only
sequential investment allows investment in the first period as this can constitute
a self-enforcing contract.
In the literature, vertical disintegration often is interpreted as a commitment
device (Crémer, 1995; Graciano, 1995; Chen, 2005). In Graciano (1995), for
example, the probability that a supplier will experience a delay in the production
schedule is observable only within a firm. Hence, a buyer may renegotiate the
contract with its in-house seller if the latter experiences a delay. Anticipating this,
the seller’s incentive to deliver on time suffers. Through vertical disintegration
the buyer commits to terminate the project if the supplier is not able to complete
it within the original budget limits. In our model, forming a business group
is preferred to integration if its costs, which are the distortions of the output
decisions, are overcompensated by the cost-cut in the first period. A cost-cutting
investment already in the first period is only possible in a business group when
it solves the ex post moral hazard problem through establishing a self-enforcing
contract.
The set-up of our model is closest to the analysis by Bolton and Scharfstein
(1990). They study the ex post moral hazard problem of financing if it is im-
possible to enforce a debt contract that is contingent on profit. In a two-period
setting, the investor will refinance the firm in the second period only if the firm
repays its loan in the first period. This repayment has to be high enough to cover
the investor’s expected loss from financing in the second period. Like Bolton
and Scharfstein, we focus on problems of contract enforcement. Therefore, we do
not factor in problems of asymmetric information between creditor and debtor.
Our analysis departs from the Bolton-Scharfstein model by incorporating sev-
eral firms. We derive the organizational structure, the sequencing of investments
and the terms of the credit contract that constitute a self-enforcing contract. In
this theoretical framework, we point out the advantage which an internal capital
market may have in an economy with imperfect institutions.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide an example of
business groups in emerging markets by describing the specific economic and in-
stitutional environment in Russia and the way business groups operate there. In
section 3, the model of a business group is presented. We characterize the or-
ganizational structure, the sequencing of investment, and the terms of the credit
contract. Both the optimal sequencing of investment and the incentive to integrate
are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
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2. Business Groups in Russia
In a transition country like Russia many institutions that normally support the
functioning of markets in an economy are missing. As a starting point for our
model, we describe the economic and institutional framework faced by Russian
firms and the characteristics of Russian business groups.
Russia’s industrial structure is inherited from central planning. It was, and to
a large degree still is, characterized by high vertical dependence and geographical
segmentation. Vertical dependence between firms is so strong that “each firm
in the chain may be acting as both a monopsonist and a monopolist” (Brown
et al, 1993, p. 30f). This structure was created by the industrial ministries
that thought of an economy as processes along an assembly line (Brown et al,
1993). Geographical segmentation is due to the fact that regional authorities
were responsible for planning the less important commodities. Therefore, after
planning was abandoned the markets that emerged remained local. This structure
is difficult to change: the underdevelopment of the transportation system imposes
significant barriers to trade (Broadman, 2001, Avdasheva, 2002). The credit
market shows similar characteristics. In many regions, the successor of the former
state-owned bank continues to dominate the local market (Claeys, Schoors and
Lanine, 2005).
Legal institutions in Russia are deficient in many respects. Public contract
enforcement in Russia is still rather difficult. There is a serious lack of juridical
infrastructure. For example, there are only one fifth as many legal professionals
per capita as in western legal cultures (Blankenagel, 2000). As a result, it takes
a long time for a verdict to be made. Moreover, there are substantial costs of
going to court (Greif and Kandel, 1995). After a verdict is made, the seizure of
assets through the bailiff service can take an additional several months (Kahn,
2002).8 It is therefore not surprising that many Russian firms do not rely on pub-
lic contract enforcement; among 269 firms interviewed only 55.5 per cent believe
that courts can enforce contracts (Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002). Al-
ternative mechanisms have evolved to circumvent the legal system. The so-called
“integrated business group (IBG)” can be used as one example.
At first sight, the term IBG may seem contradictory and misleading. We
therefore contrast IBGs with other organizational forms. Firms in an IBG remain
legally independent. Thus, they are not vertically integrated. However, they
cooperate more intensively than firms in “industrial networks” (Avdasheva, 2002).
One of the mechanisms that ties these firms together is common financial control.
8Kahn (2002) argues that the bailiff’s incentives for addressing cases where the value of a
claim is substantial are destroyed by the wage structure. Moreover, bailiffs are poorly supervised
and their endowment, e.g. with telephones and computers, is insufficient.
6
This may include a system of selective credit financing (Avdasheva et al, 2000).
Dynkin and Sokolov (2002) even see the development of own financial structures
as a particular characteristic of IBGs.
One important player in some IBGs was Incombank.9 The bank exerted com-
mon financial control over firms. In most cases, Incombank did not hold a con-
trolling equity stake in these firms but exerted control through financing invest-
ments (Avdasheva, 2000). For instance, Incombank was a member of “Morskaya
Tekhnika”, a Financial-Industrial-Group (FIG) which is a particular form of an
IBG (Evnevich, 2004).10 “Morskaya Tekhnika” was founded in order to construct
submarines. The main idea was that the bank can control and direct financial
flows along the whole production chain, from the exploitation of natural resources
to the sale of final products (Zinin, 1996). Moreover, the loans granted were
supposed to improve the efficiency of the firms in the group (Media Monitoring
Integrum, 1996).
Perotti and Gelfer (2001) study the effects on firm performance of membership
in a Financial-Industrial-Group (FIG). The authors discriminate between bank-
led and industry-led FIGs and non-group firms. They observe that there is a
negative correlation between internal finance and investment in bank-led groups.
These results suggest that there is substantial financial reallocation in bank-led
FIGs. However, the average investment does not differ substantially among the
three subgroups. Finally, Perotti and Gelfer (2001) deduce that bank-led FIGs al-
locate capital comparatively better than other firms. The sensitivity of investment
to Tobin’s Q is positive and significant only in that subgroup. The positive effect
of membership in a commercial group, such as a FIG, is confirmed by a recent
study (Pyle, 2006). Pyle’s study shows that members of commercial groups in-
vest significantly more in new technologies or new modes of production, and more
often have growing output and sales and greatly improved financial performance,
than non-members do. An explanation for their success is that firms in FIGs have
better access to credit. For them, bank lending depends less on the predictability
of law enforcement. This result is interpreted as evidence that business groups
are substitutes for judicial enforcement of contracts (Shvets, 2006).
3. Model of a Business Group
3.1. Model
Our model captures the main features of the Russian economy in the following
way. We consider a two period model. In the first period the institutions are
9However, Incombank failed after the financial crisis in 1998.
10For a detailed analysis of FIGs see Johnson (1997).
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still imperfect. For the investor, this means that repayment cannot be enforced
by going to court. This gives rise to ex post moral hazard. In the second period,
the institutions have improved and contracts are enforceable. This is common
knowledge. Consequently, no problem of ex post moral hazard arises. To simplify
the analysis, there is no discounting.
To capture the imperfect competitive environment, we consider a model with
a chain of monopolies. The chain of monopolies reflects the externalities between
producers in a business group. The monopolistic producer of the intermediate
good is called manufacturer M . M produces an intermediate good at constant
marginal costs of c and sets a price pM . The retailer R, who is also a monopolist,
then faces a marginal cost for his input (the intermediate good) of pM . In addi-
tion, the retailer incurs constant marginal costs of k per unit, e.g. for servicing
customers. The retailer sets a price p. The final demand function is D (p) = 1−p.
Solving the game by backward induction, it is straightforward to show that the
manufacturer produces q = 1−c−k
4
units of the intermediate good which is sold
to the retailer at a price of pM = 1+c−k2 . Thus, the manufacturer’s profit is
ΠM = (1−c−k)
2
8
. The retailer sells these goods at a price of p = 3+c+k
4
and gets
a profit of ΠR = (1−c−k)
2
16
. In this standard model of a vertical structure, double
marginalization is responsible for a production level that is even lower than in the
monopoly case and, thus too low from a social welfare perspective.
Both firms can invest in order to reduce their costs and this, in turn, increases
the quantity supplied in equilibrium. If the manufacturer invests IM , its costs
decrease from cH to cL. The retailer achieves a cost cut from kH to kL if he
invests IR. Due to the vertical structure, the investment decision of M exerts an
externality on R (and vice versa). We assume that carrying out the investment
is efficient in the sense that the sum of additional profits generated by both firms
in both periods exceeds the costs of investment. Furthermore, we assume that
cH + kH ≤ 1.
M and R, together with other firms, some of which have excess funds, decide
to form a business group. The crucial feature of this business group is that it
has a common bank B that makes financial decisions. B collects excess funds
and grants credit to firms within the business group that need financing. B can
commit to financing even if, in the short run, the repayment does not cover the
amount of credit granted.11 In our model, the bank commits in the first period
to finance a firm in the second period even though granting the loan might yield
a loss. However, B also faces a zero-profit constraint in the long run. Thus, B
establishes central financial control. The members of the business group have
11Usually, the bank owns shares of the firms in the group. It is therefore interested in cost-
cutting investments.
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better information about each other than outsiders do. One reason could be that
they have interacted previously. To capture this idea in the simplest way we
assume that information between group members is symmetric. Due to enormous
informational asymmetries, there is no financing from outside investors. Since
neither M nor R get credit from outside banks, B has a monopoly in financing
them.
3.2. Ex Post Moral Hazard and Market Failure
We start by investigating the loan granted by B in a business group in a one
period framework. Suppose that B grants credit in the amount of IM toM in the
first period when the institutions are still imperfect. M is always better off by
defaulting. As B anticipates this opportunistic behavior it does not grant credit
at all. Thus, no investment is made because the ex post moral hazard problem
cannot be solved in a one period framework (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990). This
result implies that it is also impossible to finance both investments IM and IR in
the first period.
Next, we show that credit will only be granted if a self-enforcing contract can
be designed. In order to keep the analysis as simple as possible we study a model
with two periods, where functioning institutions are in place in the last period.12
In our case, a contract is self-enforcing if the sequencing of the investment decisions
is chosen appropriately.13 From the result above, it is evident that the investment
projects have to be financed sequentially. We derive both possible sequences of
investments and check whether they solve the ex post moral hazard problem.
First, we analyze the case where investment in the first period is undertaken by
M and in the second period by R. Second, we analyze the case where investment
is undertaken by R in the first period and byM in the second period. In the next
section, we discuss the optimal sequencing.
12The evidence from transition countries shows that after a decade of transition, the “law
on the books” has developed much faster than law enforcement (EBRD, 2004). Thus, the
improvement in the institutional environment can be seen as a gradual development. In a
multi-period model, contract enforcement has to work only in the last period.
13An alternative solution might be that firms interact repeatedly on the product market and
punish the firm that did not repay. However, in emerging markets the uncertainty is very high
and therefore firms expect that repeated interaction with a particular partner occurs only with
a certain probability. Moreover, interaction may take place only infrequently. Therefore, it is
difficult to establish a long-term relationship with reputation effects.
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3.3. Case I: M Invests in the First Period
The time structure of this model that features two periods of production is as
follows: before the financial decisions are made, M , R and the other firms decide
about forming a business group. Then, B makes a take-it-or-leave-it credit offer
to M . In the first period, M invests if he is awarded the funds. Next, M decides
on the price for the intermediate good, and R determines its price. The prices
determine the production level. At the end of period 1, M either repays B or
defaults, depending on which action maximizes profit. After M ’s action, B can
decide about financing R. In the second period, R invests. Both the firms M
and R set second-period prices and make their production decisions. The time
structure is illustrated in Figure 1.
[Figure 1]
In order to derive a self-enforcing investment contract that ensures the cost-
cutting we need the following assumptions that guarantee that the firms are not
able to self-finance the investment or do not have an incentive to do so:
Assumption I1 : 1
16

(1− cL − kL)2 − (1− cL − kH)2

< IR
Assumption I2 : 3
16

(1− cL − kL)2 − (1− cL − kH)2

> IR and
3
8

(1− cL − kH)2 − (1− cH − kH)2

> IM
Assumption I3 : 3(1−cL−kH)
2
16
< IR
Assumption I1 says that the additional profit for R generated through invest-
ment IR in the second period is lower than the investment needed. This implies
that R would not self-finance the investment and that the bank would not finance
only IR. According to assumption I2, each investment increases the joint profits
ofM and R by more than the investment costs. Thus, it is profitable for R andM
to undertake investment IR. The reason that the impact of investment on profit
for R differs from the impact on the joint profit of R andM is the externality that
results for M from the investment by R because of the vertical structure. Note
that the profit generated by IM is higher as the cost cut is already realized in the
first period. Assumption I3 states that the sum of profits generated by R and
M in the first period are too low to cover the costs of investment in the second
period.
Figure 2 depicts the threshold values of IR. The upper threshold value is
determined by assumption I2. The lower threshold value is determined either
by assumption I1 or I3. Figure 2a shows the parameter range when assumption
I1 is binding whereas figure 2b shows the parameter range when I3 is binding.
Whether assumption I1 or I3 describes the lower threshold value depends on the
size of kH . The higher kH , the less likely it is that assumption I3 constitutes the
threshold value.
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[Figure 2]
The following proposition describes the credit contract offered, i.e. the repay-
ment in period 1, denoted by ZM1 , and that in period 2, denoted by Z
R
2 .
Proposition 1. In case I, the bank B offers credit only if the repayment in
period 1 is ZM1 ≥ IR + IM +
(1−cL−kH)2
16
− (1−cL−kL)
2
16
. In period 2, it demands as
a repayment ZR2 =
(1−cL−kL)2
16
− (1−cL−kH)
2
16
.
Proof: See the Appendix.
We assumed that R would never use equity to finance its investment IR be-
cause the profit generated is too low (Assumption I1 ).14 However, the investment
is profitable for the group due to the strong externality that IR causes forM (As-
sumption I2 ). According to Proposition 1, the repayment ZR2 that B demands in
the second period cannot exceed the amount investment IR adds to the profit of
R.15 Otherwise, it would hurt R’s participation constraint (PC-R). B extracts the
additional profit because it exerts its monopoly power. However, this repayment
does not cover investment IR; B makes an expected loss. B grants credit only if
the loss in the second period is covered by the repayment from M in the first pe-
riod. Thus, M has to subsidize R’s investment in the second period. Proposition
2 shows when this contract is feasible.
Proposition 2. In case I, forming a business group solves the ex post moral
hazard problem if 3
16

(1− cL − kL)2 − (1− cL − kH)2

≥ IR + IM and
1
16

(1− cL − kL)2 + (1− cL − kH)2

≥ IR + IM .
Proof: See the Appendix.
The driving forces for this solution are the two externalities. First, due to the
vertical structure, R’s investment has a positive effect on M ’s profit. As IR de-
creases R’s costs to kL, the quantity sold increases and, consequently, the profits
of both R andM increase. Second, default byM results in a negative externality
on R. If M does not repay, B does not grant credit to R in the second period
because it would make an expected loss. Accordingly, M anticipates that his de-
fault prevents R from investing in a cost-cutting technology, and that he loses the
14This is also the reason R does not contribute its profit generated in period 1 to reduce the
amount of credit needed in period 2.
15In Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) only a proportion of the profit is verifiable. In contrast, in
our analysis, the increase in profit in the second period is contractible as institutions function
perfectly. However, the results generated in our model would still be obtained if only a proportion
of the profit is contractible.
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potential increase in his own profit ΠM . For the conditions given in Proposition
2, it is optimal forM to repay. Note that if (1− cL − kL)2 > 2 (1− cL − kH)2 and
the liquidity constraint of M is fulfilled, M ’s incentive compatibility constraint
always holds. For this parameter constellation, R’s cost reduction has the addi-
tional effect of reducing M ’s incentive to default because, in the case of default,
M would not enjoy an increased profit in the second period.
Lower investment expenditures increase the parameter range in which a self-
enforcing contract is feasible. However, it is important to note that IR has to
exceed a certain threshold as defined in Assumption I1 and I3 respectively in
order to establish an ex post moral hazard problem. M ’s incentive to repay
increases as kL decreases because lower costs of R increase R’s demand for the
intermediate good and thereby M ’s profit in the second period.
3.4. Case II: R Invests in the First Period
Next, we study the reversed timing of investments. In this scenario, R invests in
the first period andM in the second. All other actions remain the same as before.
Figure 3 illustrates the timing of events.
[Figure 3]
Assumption II1 : 1
8

(1− cL − kL)2 − (1− cH − kL)2

< IM
Assumption II2 : 3
16

(1− cL − kL)2 − (1− cH − kL)2

> IM and
3
8

(1− cH − kL)2 − (1− cH − kH)2

> IR
Assumption II3 : 3
16
(1− cH − kL)2 < IM
According to assumption II1, the additional profit generated by M is too low
to cover the costs of investment IM . Still, both investments increase the joint
profit of M and R by an amount that is higher than the costs of investment
(Assumption II2 ). Assumption II3 states that the firms do not have enough
liquid means to finance IM themselves in the second period.
Analogously to Proposition 1 the third proposition describes the credit con-
tract offered by B.
Proposition 3. In case II, B grants credit only if the repayment in period 1 is
ZR1 ≥ IR + IM +
(1−cH−kL)2
8
− (1−cL−kL)
2
8
. In period 2, it demands as a repayment
ZM2 =
(1−cL−kL)2
8
− (1−cH−kL)
2
8
.
In period 2,M ’s additional profit generated by the investment is insufficient to
cover the costs of investment. Therefore,M would not self-finance the investment
project. The loss that B makes with this investment has to be covered by R’s
12
first period repayment. Proposition 4 determines the parameter values for which
offering this contract solves the ex post moral hazard problem.
Proposition 4. In case II, forming a business group solves the ex post moral
hazard problem if 3
16

(1− cL − kL)2 − (1− cH − kL)2

≥ IR + IM and
1
16

2 (1− cL − kL)2 − (1− cH − kL)2

≥ IR + IM .
Proof: See the Appendix.
As before, the interaction of the two externalities can be exploited by B to
design a self-enforcing contract. R’s decision to repay influencesM ’s opportunity
to invest, and therefore increases its own profit because M ’s investment increases
ΠR too.16
The results in Proposition 2 and 4 show that the cost reduction in the second
period plays a crucial role. In case I, M has an incentive to repay if the cost
reduction by the second period investment IR exceeds the crucial value described
in Proposition 2. In contrast, in case II, the cost reduction by IM has to be high
enough to give R an incentive to repay. In general, the larger the cut in costs in
period 2, the higher the externality that increases the second-period profit of the
firm investing in period 1. Hence, the incentive to repay in period 1 increases.
Comparing the results in the two cases reveals that the externality caused by the
second-period investment is higher in case I where R invests in period 2.
The theoretical analysis of the non-integrated business group has shown that
the externality that investment of M places on R provides an incentive for M
to repay (and vice versa). In an integrated structure, these externalities would
disappear, and with them, M ’s incentive to repay. Thus, a self-enforcing con-
tract solving the ex post moral hazard problem would not be feasible in such an
organizational setting.
4. Discussion of Results
4.1. Optimal Sequencing
The arguments above have shown that the type of contract, in particular the
sequencing of investments, depends crucially on the characteristics of the projects,
as described by the parameter constellations. When designing a contract, three
restrictions have to be considered. They are described in general terms here. First,
16If the cost-cutting effect of M ’s investment is such that (1− cL − kL)2 > 2 (1− cH − kL)2,
R’s incentive compatibility constraint always holds, provided that R’s liquidity constraint is
fulfilled.
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profits generated in both firms in the first period must not exceed the investment
expenses in the second period (Assumption 3). Otherwise, the firms could join
forces and self-finance the second-period investment. Under these circumstances,
the firm investing in the first period would no longer have an incentive to repay.
Hence, no credit would be granted in the first period.
Second, the profit generated in the firm which invests in the first period has
to be high enough to cover the repayment that B needs to break even (LC). Since
the bank makes an expected loss in the second period, it must obtain a positive
profit in the first period. The bank’s second-period loss, which has to be covered
by the firm that invests in the first period, can be interpreted as a subsidy for the
firm investing in the second period. The more the profit of the firm investing in
the second period increases by second period investment, the lower the subsidy
needs to be.
Third, the firm investing in the first period must have an incentive to repay
(IC). Generally, this firm decides either to repay, and thereby subsidize the firm
investing in the second period, or to default. The incentive compatibility con-
straint, which guarantees that the firm investing in the first period repays its
loan, is fulfilled more easily if the cost-cutting effect of the second period invest-
ment is higher than that in the first period. This implies that the externality
from the second period investment is higher. Therefore, investment made in the
second period increases the profit of the firm that has invested in the first period
more strongly. Moreover, the profit of the firm that invests in the second period
is higher and therefore the subsidy needed is lower. This makes the liquidity
constraint of the firm investing in the first period less demanding too.
These arguments apply regardlessly of whether M or R invests in the first
period. They already show a potential tension in the sequencing of investments.
When determining the sequence of investment, the business group faces the fol-
lowing trade-off. The business group wants to ensure the possibility of investing
in the first period at all by solving the ex post moral hazard problem through the
appropriate sequencing. However, this might imply that it has to postpone the
investment that cuts costs most strongly to the second period. The trade-off is
illustrated in the following parametrized example:
Example 1. Suppose that IM = 0.0591, cH = 0.5, cL = 0.05 and IR = 0.00557,
kH = 0.5, kL = 0.2. In this case, a self-enforcing contract can be designed if R
invests in the first period and M invests in the second period.
If M invests in the first period and R invests in the second, the contract is
not self-enforcing. The reason is that the joint profit of M and R in the first
period is high enough to finance IR in the second period. However, the profits
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generated would be higher if IM is undertaken in the first period as the cost
reduction of ∆c = 0.45 is higher than that reached through IR which is given by
∆k = 0.3. This example shows that solving the ex post moral hazard problemmay
require postponing the investment which reduces costs more strongly to the second
period. Facilitating investment in the first period is the dominant requirement
since otherwise the cost reduction in the first period cannot be obtained.17 Of
course, the optimal sequencing depends on the cost reductions reached relative
to the investment needed. If the cost reduction described in example 1 can be
obtained with different investments, for example, IM = 0.098 and IR = 0.0379,
then the contract is self-enforcing if M invests in the first period and R invests in
the second period.
4.2. Incentive to Integrate
Naturally, the question arises of why firms within the business group do not
integrate in order to reduce double marginalization and, thus, increase profit. On
the one hand, vertical integration would increase the group’s output and thus
profit to (1−c−k)
2
4
. On the other hand, the externalities would disappear in an
integrated structure, and with them, the incentive to repay of the firm investing
in the first period. Thus, it is not possible to establish a self-enforcing contract
solving the ex post moral hazard problem in an integrated firm. The following
proposition describes the firm’s decision.
Proposition 5. In Case I, it is optimal for the firms to form a business group if
3 (1− cL − kH)2 − 4 (1− cH − kH)2 − (1− cL − kL)2 ≥ 0 provided that the con-
ditions of proposition 2 hold. Otherwise, M and R integrate.
In Case II, it is optimal for the firms to form a business group if
3 (1− cH − kL)2 − 4 (1− cH − kH)2 − (1− cL − kL)2 ≥ 0 provided the conditions
of proposition 4 hold. Otherwise, M and R integrate.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Firms decide to integrate either if integration is more profitable (as can be seen
from the conditions in proposition 5) or if it is not possible to solve the ex post
moral hazard problem through forming a business group because the conditions
given in proposition 2 and proposition 4 respectively fail to hold.18
17These countervailing effects also highlight the inefficiency that arises if self-enforcing con-
tracts have to be used, as explicit contracts are not enforceable in this framework.
18Of course, remaining separate firms is dominated by either forming a business group or
integrating.
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When deciding about whether to integrate or not, M and R face the following
trade-off: integration definitely increases output in the second period but leads
to higher production costs in the first period and thereby potentially to a lower
production level. The following example is used to illustrate Proposition 5. It
shows a case in which firms do not have an incentive to integrate because the
profit of the business group, denoted by ΠBG, is higher than the profit of an
integrated firm, denoted by ΠI .
Example 2. Suppose that IM = 0.098, cH = 0.5, cL = 0.05 and IR = 0.0379, kH =
0.5, kL = 0.20. In this case, the profit of a business group is higher than that of
an integrated firm, i.e. ΠBG = 0.09573 > ΠI = 0.09293.
The parameters are such that financing M in the first period and R in the
second period allow a self-enforcing contract to be designed. The total profit
of the business group in both periods is ΠBG = 0.09573. The amount of goods
produced is qBG1 = 0.1125 in the first period and q
BG
2 = 0.1875 in the second
period. An integrated firm does not produce at all in the first period, but produces
qI2 = 0.375 in the second period. The total profit of an integrated firm amounts
to ΠI = 0.09293.
For this example, the problem of poor institutions becomes evident at once.
Due to missing contract enforcement, outside creditors are reluctant to lend in
the first period. The (social) costs of credit rationing can be substantial. In
our example, only a small amount of credit is needed to reduce manufacturing
costs dramatically. This cost reduction leads to an increase in the amount of
goods produced. Integration destroys the possibility of designing self-enforcing
contracts because it eliminates the externalities betweenM and R. Consequently,
an integrated firm is not able to finance a cost saving investment byM in the first
period. It can reap the benefits of lower manufacturing costs only in the second
period. Thus, the total profit of an integrated firm is lower in our example.
5. Conclusion
We started this paper with the question of how business groups can substitute
for imperfect institutions, especially where it is impossible to enforce contracts.
We set up a model with vertically related firms and a bank as an external lender.
The model shows how a self-enforcing contract solves ex post moral hazard of
finance. The analysis reveals that vertically related firms do not integrate but
instead they establish common financial control through having one bank that
finances all firms within the group.
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The first result of our analysis is that firms in a business group can already
invest in the first period when unaffiliated firms or integrated firms are credit
rationed because of deficient institutions. Thereby our model of common financial
control and sequential investment provides a potential explanation for the superior
performance of business groups in Russia. They invest more in new technologies
and modes of production and, as a result, are likely to grow and improve their
financial performance, as is shown by Pyle (2006). The second result is that
funds are reallocated within the business group. The reallocation is due to the
externalities of the vertical structure which are thereby partially internalized. As
a third result we show that firms can have an incentive not to integrate in order
to obtain a loan already in the first period.
In emerging markets, it can take a long time for contracts to be enforced.19
However, if the self-enforcing contracts are repeated within this vertical struc-
ture until institutions that facilitate contract enforcement are in place, the moral
hazard problem can be solved in several periods. Because of this argument, the
positive effect of internal capital markets should increase relative to its negative
effect. However, while contracts can sustain financial transactions between firms
that know each other, they do not help to develop new interactions (Johnson,
McMillan and Woodruff, 2002).
19According to Arrow (2000, P. 13) “(...) the readjustment of institutions is an extended
process.”
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6. Appendix
6.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Provided that M has cut its costs to cL, R invests in the second period only
if he is not worse off than without a credit financed investment. Formally, his
participation constraint is
(1− cL − kL)2
16
− ZR2 ≥
(1− cL − kH)2
16
. (PC-R)
B will increase ZR2 so that R’s participation constraint binds. B offers credit if
it obtains a non-negative payoff from this two-period relationship withM and R.
After inserting the optimal ZR2 , B’s zero-profit constraint can be written as
ZM1 +
(1− cL − kL)2
16
− (1− cL − kH)
2
16
− IR − IM = 0 (PC-B)
Solving for the first period repayment ZM1 = I
R + IM + (1−cL−kH)
2
16
− (1−cL−kL)
2
16
is
determined. Q.E.D.
6.2. Proof of Proposition 2
For M , it has to be optimal to repay after period 1. Formally, this is expressed
in its incentive compatibility constraint:
(1− cL − kL)2
8
− ZM1 ≥
(1− cL − kH)2
8
or, after substituting ZM1 according to (PC −B)
3
16

(1− cL − kL)2 − (1− cL − kH)2

≥ IR + IM . (IC-M)
M ’s incentive compatibility constraint also guarantees that he demands credit
to finance the investment in period 1, i.e. that (1−cL−kH)
2
8
+ (1−cL−kL)
2
8
−ZM1 ≥ 0.
Moreover, the profit generated in period 1 has to be high enough to cover the
repayment ZM1 . The liquidity constraint is given by:
(1− cL − kH)2
8
− ZM1 ≥ 0 (LC-M)
or, after inserting ZM1 = I
R + IM + (1−cL−kH)
2
16
− (1−cL−kL)
2
16
1
16

(1− cL − kL)2 + (1− cL − kH)2

≥ IR + IM .
Q.E.D.
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6.3. Proof of Proposition 4
The repayment must fulfill R’s incentive compatibility constraint and its liquidity
constraint. Repayment ZR1 is incentive compatible if
(1− cL − kL)2
16
− ZR1 ≥
(1− cH − kL)2
16
(IC-R)
or, after inserting ZR1 = I
R+IM+ (1−cH−kL)
2
8
− (1−cL−kL)
2
8
fromB’s participation
constraint
3
16

(1− cL − kL)2 − (1− cH − kL)2

≥ IR + IM .
This condition guarantees that R prefers the credit financed investment to the
outside option of no investment. In either period, credit financing is associated
with a profit of ΠR1 =
(1−cH−kL)2
16
. Moreover, R’s first period profit has to be high
enough to cover the repayment ZR1 . Formally, R’s liquidity constraint is given by:
(1− cH − kL)2
16
− ZR1 ≥ 0 (LC-R)
or, after inserting ZR1 = I
R + IM + (1−cH−kL)
2
8
− (1−cL−kL)
2
8
1
16

2 (1− cL − kL)2 − (1− cH − kL)2

≥ IR + IM .
Q.E.D.
6.4. Proof of Proposition 5
In Case I, the profits of an integrated firm in the first and the second period
amount to 1
4

(1− cH − kH)2 + (1− cL − kL)2

whereas the profits of a business
group are 3
16

(1− cL − kH)2 + (1− cL − kL)2

. Comparing these two profit levels
yields the condition stated in Proposition 5. In Case II, the profit of the business
group would be 3
16

(1− cH − kL)2 + (1− cL − kL)2

. Q.E.D.
19
7. References
Almeida, Heitor and Wolfenzon, Daniel, “A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership
and Family Business Groups”, Journal of Finance, forthcoming, 2006a.
Almeida, Heitor and Wolfenzon, Daniel, “Should Business Groups be Disman-
tled? The Equilibrium Costs of Efficient Internal Capital Markets”, Journal of
Financial Economics 79, 99-144, January 2006b.
Arrow, Kenneth, “Economic Transition: Speed and Scope”, Journal of Insti-
tutional and Theoretical Economics 156, 9-18, March 2000.
Avdasheva Svetlana, “Processing (Tolling) Contracts in Russian Industries:
an Institutional Perspective”, HSE Working Paper Series, WP1/2002/04, 2002,
available at: http://www.hse.ru/science/preprint/WP1_2002_04.pdf
Avdasheva Svetlana, Balyukevich V., Gorbachev A. et al, “Analysis of the
role of integrating structures in the Russian product markets (Analiz roli inte-
griruemykh struktur na rossiyskikh tovarnykh rynkakh)”, Moskow: TEIS Press,
2000.
Bianco, Magda and Nicodano, Giovanna, “Business Groups and Debt”, Euro-
pean Economic Review, forthcoming, 2006.
Blankenagel, Alexander, “Legal Reforms in Russia: Visible Steps, Obvious
Gaps, and an Invisible Hand?” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Eco-
nomics 156, 90-119, March 2000.
Bolton, Patrick, and Scharfstein, David S., “A Theory of Predation Based
on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting” American Economic Review 80,
1:93-106, March 1990.
Broadman, Harry, “Competition and Business Entry in Russia”, Finance and
Development 38, 2:22-25, June 2001.
Brown, Annette N., Ickes, Barry and Ryterman, Ickes, The Myth of Monopoly:
A New View of Industrial Structure in Russia, unpublished manuscript, Pennsyl-
vania State University, 1993.
Brusco, Sandro and Panunzi, Fausto, “Reallocation of Corporate Resources
and Managerial Incentives in Internal Capital Markets”, European Economic Re-
view 49, 3:659-681, 2005.
Cestone, Giacinta and Rumagalli, Chiara, “The Strategic Impact of Resource
Flexibility on Business Groups”, RAND Journal of Economics 36, 1:193-214,
2005.
Chen, Yongmin, “Vertical Disintegration”, Journal of Economics & Manage-
ment Strategy 14, 1:209-229, 2005.
20
Claeys, Sophie, Schoors, Koen and Lanine, Gleb, Bank Supervision Russian
Style: Rules versus Enforcement, BOFIT Discussion Paper No. 10/2005, 2005.
Crémer, Jacques, “Arm’s Length Relationships”, Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics CX, 2:275-295, 1995.
Dewatripont, Mathias and Roland, Gérard, “Soft Budget Constraints, Transi-
tion, and Financial Systems”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
156, 245-260, March 2000.
Dynkin A. and Sokolov A., “Integrated Business Groups in the Russian Econ-
omy (Integrirovannye biznes-gruppy v rossiyskoy ekonomike)”, Voprosy Economiky
4, 78-95, 2002.
EBRD, Transition Report 2004: Infrastructure in Transition, EBRD: London,
2004.
Evnevich, Maria, Managing integrated business groups in contemporary Rus-
sia (Problemy upravleniya integrirovannymi biznes-gruppami v sovremennoy Rossii),
Management today 3, 2004.
Feenstra, Robert C., Huang, Deng-Shing, and Hamilton, Gary G., “A Market
Power Based Model of Business Groups”, Journal of Economic Behaviour and
Organization 51, 459-485, 2003.
Gerschenkron, Alexander, “Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective.
A Book of Essays”, Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962.
Ghatak, Maitreesh and Kali, Raja, “Financially Interlinked Business Groups”,
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 10, 591—619, 2001.
Granovetter, Mark, “Business Groups”, in: Smelser, N.J. and Swedberg, R.
(Eds.), The Handbook of Economic Sociology, Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 1994, pp. 453-475.
Graziano, Clara, “Cost Observability and Renegotiation”, Journal of Eco-
nomic Behavior and Organization 28, 359-372, 1995.
Greif, Avner and Kandel, Eugene, “Contract Enforcement Institutions: His-
torical Perspective and Current Status in Russia”, in: Lazear, E.P. (Eds.), Eco-
nomic Transition in Eastern Europe and Russia: Realities of Reform, Stanford,
Hoover Institution Press, 1995, pp. 291-321.
Johnson, Juliet, “Russia’s Emerging Financial-Industrial Groups”, Post-Soviet
Affairs 13, 4: 333 - 365, 1997.
Johnson, Simon, McMillan, John and Woodruff, Christopher, “Courts and
Relational Contracts”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 18, 1:221-
77, 2002.
Kahn, Peter L., “The Russian Bailiffs Service and the Enforcement of Civil
Judgments”, Post-Soviet Affairs 18, 2:148-173, 2002.
21
Kali, Raja, “Contractual Governance, Business Groups and Transition”, Eco-
nomics of Transition 10, 2:255-272, 2002.
Kali, Raja, “Endogenous Business Networks”, Journal of Law, Economics,
and Organization 15, 3:615-636, 1999.
Khanna, Tarun, “Business Groups and Social Welfare in Emerging Markets:
Existing Evidence and Unanswered Questions”, European Economic Review 44,
748-761, 2000.
Khanna, Tarun and Palepu, Krishna, “Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerg-
ing Markets? An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups”, Journal of
Finance LV, 2:867-891, April 2000.
Khanna, Tarun and Yafeh, Yishay, Business Groups in Emerging Markets:
Paragons or Parasites?, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5208, London: Center for
Economic Policy Research, September 2005.
Kim, Se-Jik, “Bailout and Conglomeration”, Journal of Financial Economics
71, 315-347, 2004.
Media Monitoring Integrum, The first-rate private bank of Russia Inkombank
was eight years on November 11th (11 noyabrya krupneyshemu negosudarstven-
nomu banku Rossii - Inkombanku ispolnilos’ vosem’ let), 11.11.1996, in: Inte-
grum Media Monitoring, Banks and Banking 1996-1999, http://www.integrum.ru
(22.05.2006).
Perotti, Enrico and Gelfer, Stanislav, “Red Barons or Robber Barons? Gov-
ernance and Investment in Russian Financial-Industrial Groups”, European Eco-
nomic Review 45, 1601-1617, 2001.
Pyle, William, “Collective Action and Post-Communist Enterprise: The Eco-
nomic Logic of Russia’s Business Associations”, Europe-Asia Studies, forthcoming,
2006.
Pyle, William, “Overbanked and Credit-Starved: A Paradox of the Transi-
tion”, Journal of Comparative Economics 32, 1:26-51, 2002.
Recanatini, Francesca and Ryterman, Randi, Disorganization or Self-Organization,
unpublished manuscript, World Bank: Washington DC, 2000.
Smirnov, Vladimir and Wait, Andrew, “Hold-up and Sequential Specific In-
vestment”, RAND Journal of Economics 35, 2:386-400, 2004a.
Smirnov, Vladimir andWait, Andrew, “Timing of Investment, Holdup and To-
tal Welfare”, International Journal of Industrial Organization 22, 413-425, 2004b.
Shvets, Julia, “Law Enforcement and Firms’ External Finance: Evidence from
Russian Commercial Courts”, unpublished manuscript, April 2006.
Stein, Jeremy, “Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate
Resources”, Journal of Finance 52, 1:111-133, 1997.
22
Zinin, Evgeniy, Morskaya Tekhnika united Financiers and producers (Morskaya
tekhnika obedinila finansistov i promyshlennikov), Delovoy Peterburg 17 (186),
12.03.1996.
23
• Firms 
decide on 
forming a 
business
group
• B makes 
take-it-or-
leave-it-
credit 
offer to M
• M decides 
on invest-
ment
• M decides 
on price
• R decides 
on price
• M decides 
whether or 
not to 
repay 
• B decides 
whether or 
not to 
finance R
• R decides 
on invest-
ment
• R decides 
on price
• M decides 
on price
t
• R 
repays
credit
Figure 1: Time structure
( ) ( )( )22 11
16
1
HLLL kckc −−−−−
Figure 2: Illustration of the parameter space
( )21
16
3
HL kc −−
( ) ( )( )22 11
16
3
HLLL kckc −−−−−
Figure 2a
( ) ( )( )22 11
16
3
HLLL kckc −−−−−
Figure 2b
IR
IR
Assumption I1 Assumption I2
Assumption I3 Assumption I2
• Firms 
decide on 
forming a 
business
group
• B makes 
take-it-or-
leave-it-
credit 
offer to R
• R decides 
on invest-
ment
• R decides 
on price
• M decides 
on price
• R decides 
whether or 
not to 
repay
• B decides 
whether or 
not to 
finance M
• M decides 
on invest-
ment
• M decides 
on price
• R decides 
on price
t
• M 
repays
credit
Figure 3: Time structure
